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I. INTRODUCTION
On November 29, 2000, the Federal Circuit fundamentally
changed patent law in the United States. In deciding the case of Festo
Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co.,' the Federal Circuit
Court of Appeals expanded the application of prosecution history
estoppel on infringement analysis under the doctrine of equivalents.
A patent claim element that has been amended for any reason related
to patentability is precluded from any future application of the
doctrine of equivalents. 2 This fundamental change in patent practice
is sure to have an impact on patent practitioners as well as patent
owners, as it affects both patent prosecution and enforcement.
t Noreen Krall is an Assistant General Counsel at Sun Micros)stems, handling intellectual
property matter for Sun's networking technologies. Ms. Krall received her J.D. from Denver
University in 1994, a Masters Degree in Computer Science from Iona College in 1989 and a
Bachelors Degree in Electrical Engineering from Manhattan College in 1987. Celeste B. Filoia
received her B.A. in Political Philosophy from Syracuse University in 1993 and expects to
receive her J.D. from the Santa Clana University School of Law in May 2002. Ms. Filoia works
at Sun Microsystems as the program coordinator in Sun's Intellectual Property Dzpartment.
1Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
2Id. at 568.
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If. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
By assignment, Festo Corporation owns two patents related to
magnetically coupled rodless cylinders:3 the Stoll patent4 and the
Carroll patent.5  Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co. (SMC)
competes with Festo in the market for magnetic rodless cylinder
systems.6 Festo sued SMC in the United States District Court for the
District of Massachusetts, alleging infringement of the Carroll and
Stoll patents. The district court held that SMC had indeed infringed
on the two patents owned by Festo Corporation under the doctrine of
equivalents.8
The Festo patents disclosed and claimed devices with a pair of
sealing rings.9 The Stoll patent, in particular, disclosed and claimed a
sleeve made of a magnetized material.'0 The SMC devices had a
single resilient two-way sealing ring, located on one end of the
pistons." The outer portion of the sleeves of SMC's devices were
made of an aluminum alloy, not a magnetizable material.' 2 Stoll had
amended claim one to recite "sealing rings" on the piston and to recite
"a cylindrical sleeve made of a magnetized material" during
prosecution, stating the changes were made for Section 112 reasons.',
The examiner allowed the claims. 14
The district court found no literal infringement of the Stoll patent
because SMC's devices did not have magnetized sleeves.'5 The court
further declined to hold that prosecution history estoppel barred a
finding that the Stoll patent was infringed under the doctrine of
equivalents because the reason for the amendments was unclear.
16
The jury then found that claim one of the Stoll patent infringed under
the doctrine of equivalents: SMC's non-magnetizable sleeve and
3 See id. at 579 (magnetic rodless cylinder systems are used to move items along assembly
lines).
4 U.S. Patent No. 4,354,125 (issued Oct. 12, 1982); see Festo, 234 F.3d at 563.
' U.S. Patent No. 3,779,401 (issued Dec. 18, 1973); see Festo, 234 F.3d at 563.




9 Festo, 234 F.3d at 579.
'old.
" Id. at 582.
'
2 1d.
13 Id. at 583.
14d" 
,
'5 Festo, 234 E.3d at 584.
16 id.
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single seal ring performed substantially the same function, in
substantially the same way to obtain substantially the same result as
the claimed magnetizable sleeve and sealing rings.17 The jury also
found the Carroll patent infringed under the doctrine of equivalents.
18
SMC appealed and, in 1995, the Federal Circuit affirmed the
judgment in favor of Festo.' 9 While SMC's petition for certiorari
was pending, the United States Supreme Court decided Warner-
Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co.20 The Supreme Court
subsequently granted certiorari in Festo, vacating the Federal Circuit
decision and remanding the case for reconsideration in light of
Warner-Jenkinson. On remand, a Federal Circuit panel again found
that the Carroll patent was infringed under the doctrine of
equivalents,2 ' concluding that none of the amendments made during
reexamination were "required" for successful prosecution.2
However, the court vacated the infringement judgment as to the Stoll
patent and remanded because the record did not adequately reveal the
"reason" for the amendments made during prosecution.2 In August
1999, the Federal Circuit vacated the panel ruling and granted en banc
review.
24
The en banc court barred the application of the doctrine of
equivalents on the grounds of prosecution history estoppel.25 The
court found that Festo failed to prove that the amendments to its
patent claims were unrelated to patentability and thus reversed the
judgment of infringement.26  The decision of the en banc court
expands the situations when an estoppel applies and bars any analysis
under the doctrine of equivalents for any claim element narrowed by
amendment during prosecution.
1 Id. at 585.
181d
19 Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushikd Co., 72 F.3d 857 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
20 Wamer-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17 (1997).
2'Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushild Co., 172 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
22id.
23 Id.
24 Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushild Co., 187 F.3d 1381 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
2 Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558, 586, 588 (Fed. Cir.
2000).26Id. at 588.
376 COMPUTER & HIGH TECHNOLOGYLAWJOURNAL [Vol.17
Ill. THE DOCTRINE OF EQUIVALENTS PRE-FESTO
A. Graver Tank & Manufacturing Co. v. Linde Air Products Co.
The doctrine of equivalents permits a court to find infringement
when an accused product or process falls outside the literal language
of the claims, but is equivalent to and differs only unsubstantially
from the claimed invention.27  For example, in Graver Tank, the
patent in suit claimed a welding flux containing essentially a
combination of alkaline earth metal silicate and calcium flouride.28
The accused product substituted silicates of calcium, not an alkaline
earth metal, for silicates of magnesium, an alkaline earth metal used
in the patentee's product.29  The Supreme Court applied the all
elements rule stating that infringement can be found when the accused
product "performs substantially the same function in substantially the
same way to obtain the same result." 30 The Court affirmed the lower
court decision that the accused flux containing manganese silicates
infringed under the doctrine of equivalents. In the accused flux, the
manganese silicates performed substantially the same function as the
magnesium silicates in substantially the same way to obtain
substantially the same result.
31
The purpose of the doctrine of equivalents is two-fold: to ensure
that the patentee enjoys the full benefit of the patent while also
providing that the claims give "fair notice" of the patent's scope.
32
When applied, the doctrine prevents an accused infringer from
avoiding liability simply by changing only minor details of a claimed
invention while retaining the invention's essential identity.
33
However, when applied broadly, the doctrine of equivalents "conflicts
with the definitional and public-notice functions of the statutory
claiming requirement." 34 This conflict arises from the very object of
patent law. "The object of the patent law in requiring the patentee [to
specifically define his invention] is not only to secure to him all to
which he is entitled, but to appraise the public of what is still open to
2' Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prod. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608 (1950).
28 Id. at 610.
29 id.
30 Id. at 608 (quoting Sanitary Refrigerator Co. v. Winters, 280 U.S. 30, 42 (1929)).
3' Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 611-12.
32 Festo Corp. v. Soketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kobushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558, 564 (Fed. Cir. 2000),
see also London v. Carson Pirie Scott & Co., 946 F.2d 1534 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
33 Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 608.
34 Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17,29 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
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them." 35 If the doctrine of equivalents is applied too broadly, the
public has no way of truly knowing what is still open to them. It is
this conflict that the Court more recently addressed in Warner-
Jenkinson.
B. Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co.
The Supreme Court, more recently in Warner-Jenkinson,
analyzed proving infringement under the doctrine of equivalents and
the balance with prosecution history estoppel. 6 The patent involved
in Warner-Jenkinson disclosed an improved process for purifying
dyes. 7 During prosecution, the claims were amended to change the
pH at which the process was carried out.3 8 The Hilton Davis patent
claimed pH was 6.0 for this process, while the Wamer-Jenkinson
performance of the process was at a pH of 5.0.39 On appeal, the
Federal Circuit reiterated that the application of the doctrine of
equivalents "rest[s] on the substantiality of the differences betveen
the claimed and accused products or processes." 40 Substantiality is
judged on an objective standard from the perspective of one of
ordinary skill in the relevant art.41 One of ordinary skill in the art
would know that performing ultrafiltration at a pH of 5.0 ivill allow
the membrane to perform substantially the same function in
substantially the same way to reach substantially the same result as
performing ultrafiltration at pH 6.0. The Federal Circuit found that
there was sufficient evidence to support this jury finding under the
doctrine of equivalents.
42
After granting certiorari, the Supreme Court reversed and
remanded this case back to the Federal Circuit, stating "the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit did not consider all of the
requirements as described by us today, particularly as related to
prosecution history estoppel and the preservation of some meaning
for each element in a claim.
'43
In the interest of placing reasonable limits on the doctrine of
equivalents, the Supreme Court created a presumption that when a
3 McClain v. Ortarnayer, 141 U.S. 419,424 (1891).
36 Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 17.
37 Id. at 21.
38 Id at 22.
39 Id. at 22-23.
40 Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co, Inc., 162 F.3d 1512, 1518 (Fcc. Cir. 1995).
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claim is amended during prosecution and the prosecution history does
not reveal the reason for the change, it should be presumed that there
was "a substantial reason relat[ing] to patentability for including the
limiting element added by amendment.' 4 It is up to the patentee to
rebut this presumption by showing that the reason for the amendment
was unrelated to issues of patentability. 45 If the presumption holds,
prosecution history estoppel would bar the application of the doctrine
of equivalents as to that element or claim limitation.
4 6
The Court's decision in Warner-Jenkinson reaffirmed prosecution
history estoppel as a limitation on the doctrine of equivalents. If the
reason for a claim amendment is unclear from the prosecution history,
it is presumed the amendment was for a substantial reason relating to
patentability; the burden then falls on the patentee to rebut.
Prosecution history estoppel is a complete bar to the doctrine of
equivalents where the presumption is not rebutted.
IV. THE FESTO DECISION
In the long-awaited November 29, 2000 decision by the Federal
Circuit, the 12-member en banc court addressed certain questions
relating to the doctrine of equivalents that it believed had been left
unresolved by the Supreme Court's decision in Warner-Jenkinson. In
the wake of the Supreme Court's remand of Festo per the Warner-
Jenkinson decision, the Federal Circuit had issued an order seeking
briefing and argument of five questions addressing the interplay of the47
doctrine of equivalents and prosecution history estoppel. The court
answered four of the five questions as follows:
En Banc Question 1:
For the purposes of determining whether an amendment to a claim
creates prosecution history estoppel, is "a substantial reason related
to patentability," Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chein.
Co., 520 U.S. 17, 33, 117 S. Ct. 1040, 137 L. Ed. 2d 146 (1997),
limited to those amendments made to overcome prior art under
§ 102 and § 103, or does "patentability" mean any reason affecting
the issuance of a patent?48




47 Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 187 F.3d 1381 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
48 Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558, 566 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
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Judge Schall, who answered in the negative. The court held, "that 'a
substantial reason related to patentability' is not limited to
overcoming prior art, but includes other reasons related to the
statutory requirements for a patent."49 Any amendment "that narrows
the scope of a claim for any reason related to the statutory
requirements for a patent," including 35 U.S.C. §§ 101," 102,"' 10352
and 112 53 "will give rise to prosecution history estoppel with respect
to the amended claim element."54 The court reasoned that prosecution
history estoppel functions to preserve the notice function of the claims
and to prevent patent holders from recapturing subject matter under
the doctrine of equivalents that was surrendered before the Patent
Office, and as such, there is "no reason why prosecution history
estoppel should not also arise from amendments made for other
reasons related to patentability."
s5
En Banc Question 2:
Under Warner-Jenkinson, should a "voluntary" claim
amendment-one not required by the examiner or made in
response to a rejection by an examiner for a stated reason-create
prosecution history estoppel?
5 6
In response to en banc Question 2, the eleven-judge majority held
that "voluntary claim amendments are treated the same as other
amendments. Therefore, a voluntary amendment that narrows the
scope of a claim for a reason related to the statutory requirements for
a patent will give rise to prosecution history estoppel as to the
amended claim element."57  The court reasoned that there is no
difference between the Patent Office rejecting a claim because it
believes it to be unpatentable and when an applicant amends a claim
voluntarily because he believes the claim to be unpatentable.58 "Both
voluntary amendments and amendments required by the Patent Office
signal to the public that subject matter has been surrendered."59
49 1d.
35 U.S.C.A. § 101 (West 2000) (requiring usefulness).
s' 35 U.S.C.A. § 102 (West 2000) (requiring novelty).
35 U.S.C.A. § 103 (West 2000) (requiring non-obvious subject matter).
53 35 U.S.C.A. § 112 West (2000) (requirements for a validpatent spcificationl.
'4 Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558, 566 (Fed.Cir. 2000).
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En Banc Question 3:
If a claim amendment creates prosecution history estoppel, under
Warner-Jenkinson what range of equivalents, if any, is available
under the doctrine of equivalents for the claim element so
amended? 6
0
On this question, the court was more closely split. An eight-judge
majority held that "[w]hen a claim amendment creates prosecution
history estoppel with regard to a claim element, there is no range of
equivalents available for the amended claim element. Application of
the doctrine of equivalents to the claim element is completely barred
(a 'complete bar')." 61 This issue was not addressed in Warner-
Jenkinson by the Supreme Court, but the Federal Circuit reasoned that
a complete bar will provide a greater benefit to the public. "With a
complete bar, both the public and the patentee know that once an
element of a claim is narrowed by amendment for a reason related to
patentability, that element's scope of coverage will not extend beyond
its literal terms." 62 Since both the public and the patentee will know
the scope and value of the patent, expensive litigation costs can be
avoided.63 The Federal Circuit rejected the idea of a "flexible bar" in
favor of a "complete bar" because of the importance of the notice
function.6a With the flexible bar approach, the court found that there
would be too much uncertainty in determining the scope of the patent
for both the patentee and the public.65 According to the court, "a
complete bar reigns in the doctrine of equivalents, making claim
scope more discernable in preserving the notice function of claims. 66
En Banc Question 4:
When "no explanation [for a claim amendment] is established,"
Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 33, 117 S. Ct. 1040, thus invoking
the presumption of prosecution history estoppel under Warner-
Jenkinson, what range of equivalents, if any, is available under the
doctrine of equivalents for the claim element so amended?67
In response, the en banc court found "[w]hen no explanation for
60 Festo, 234 F. 3d at 569.61 Id.
621d. at 577.
631d.
64 See id. at 578.
65 id.
66 Festo, 234 F.3d at 578.
67id.
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a claim amendment is established, no range of equivalents is available
for the claim element so amended., 68 According to the court, this
question was adequately addressed in Warner-Jenkinson.
69
En Banc Question 5:
Would a judgment of infiingement in this case violate JWarner-
Jenkinson's requirement that the application of the doctrine of
equivalents "is not allowed such broad play as to eliminate [an]
element in its entirety," 520 U.S. at 29, 117 S. Ct. 1040. In other
words, would such a judgment of infringement, post Warner-
Jenkinson, violate the "all elements" rule?70
The court did not address the all elements rule in the Festo
decision and, instead, left it for another day.7'
In Festo, the majority concluded that a complete bar to the
doctrine of equivalents best serves the notice and definitional function
of patent claims. According to the court, the notice function of the
doctrine of equivalents can be protected by prosecution history
estoppel.72 "Prosecution history estoppel is one tool that prevents the
doctrine of equivalents from vitiating the notice function of claims."
'
Prosecution history estoppel operates to prevent a patentee from
obtaining protection of subject matter that has been relinquished
during the prosecution of the patent.74 "The logic of prosecution
history estoppel is that the patentee, during prosecution, has created a
record that fairly notifies the public that the patentee has surrendered
the right to claim particular matter as within the reach of the patent"
7S
The public can look to the prosecution history to determine if any
prosecution history estoppel arises as to any claim element. If so, the
scope of protection for that element is clearly defined by its literal
terms.
Prosecution history estoppel arises from actions by the patentee,
including both voluntary and involuntary claim arguments and
6 id.
69 d. at 578 (quoting Wanier-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chen. Co., 520 U.S. 17,33 (1997)
("Where no explanation is established ... prosecution history estoppel would bar the application
of the doctrine [of] equivalents as to that element.")).
70 Festo, 234 F.3d at 578.
71 Id.
72Id. at 564.
I Id. See also Charles Greiner & Co. v. Mar-Med Mfg., Inc., 962 F.2d 1031, 1036 (Fed. Cir.
1992).
74 Pharmacia & Upjohn v. Mylan Pharms. 170 F.3d 1373, 1376-77 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
75 Festo, 234 F.3d at 564-65.
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amendments made before the USPTO.76 The doctrine of equivalents,
therefore, is subordinate to prosecution history estoppel.]
The Festo court held that prosecution history estoppel applied to
the patent claim elements at issue. During prosecution, Festo
narrowed the scope of the claims and did not establish that the change
was made for a reason unrelated to patentability and thus gave rise to
prosecution history estoppel. Because prosecution history estoppel
acts as a complete bar to the doctrine of equivalents, the application
of equivalents was barred and the finding of infringement reversed.
V. THE DISSENTING OPINIONS
A number of judges concurred-in-part and dissented-in-part from
the majority's decision, most notably on the response to en bane
Question 3. Judges Michel, Rader, Linn and Newman each wrote
separate dissents from this section of the court's opinion. A common
concern raised by each of the dissenters was summarized by Judge
Michel:
Would be copyists, of course, will exploit the majority's bar.
Unwittingly, the majority has severely limited the protection
previously available to patentees. hIdeed, it may nullify the
doctrine of equivalents. Under the iajority's approach, anyone
who wants to steal a patentee's technology need only review the
prosecution history to identify patentability related amendments,
and then make a trivial modification to that part of its product
corresponding to an amended limitation. All the other limitations
may be copied precisely. The competitor will then be free to make,
use, or sell an insubstantial variant of the patentee's invention. It
appears to me that this complete bar approach upsets the balance
that the Supreme Court has struck. Under this approach, most
patentees will lose the protection against copying that the Supreme
Court unanimously reaffirmed in Warner-Jenkinson
7 8
Many of the concurring and dissenting opinions expressed
concern that eliminating all protection under the doctrine of
equivalents does not account for the process by which patents are
obtained. Some felt the new rule adopted by the majority was a
rejection of the policy advanced by the Supreme Court in Warner-
Jenkinson. That policy was that the all elements rule and prosecution
history estoppel are sufficient to balance the competing needs of
76 Id. at 564.
77 Autogiro Co. v. United States, 384 F.2d 391,400-01 (Ct. CI. 1967).
78 Festo, 234 F.3d at 600-601.
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granting meaningful protection to patentees and of notifying the
public of the effective scope of a patentee's claims. Some also felt
that by barring all application of the doctrine of equivalents for
amended claims, all patent protection for amended claims is lost when
it comes to subsequently-arising technology while the doctrine of
equivalents will continue to accommodate later technologies in
unamended claims.
VI. CONCLUSION
According to the Federal Circuit, prosecution history estoppel
preserves the notice function of claims and prevents patent holders
from recapturing subject matter surrendered before the Patent &
Trademark Office. As such, the Federal Circuit held that prosecution
history estoppel can arise not only from amendments under 35 U.S.C.
§§ 102 and 103, but also under 35 U.S.C. §§ 101 and 112.
Prosecution history estoppel can arise whenever an amendment is
made for a reason related to patentability. However, "if a patent
holder can show from the prosecution history that a claim amendment
was not motivated by patentability concerns, the amendment will not
give rise to prosecution history estoppel."80 The prosecution record
must clearly show that the amendment was not related to
patentability, otherwise, the court must presume that the amendment
was related to patentability and apply an estoppel. Similarly, if the
record is silent as to the reason for the amendment, the court must
presume that the amendment was related to patentability and apply an
estoppel. A narrowing amendment will give rise to prosecution
history estoppel unless the prosecution record reveals that the
amendment was made for a reason unrelated to patentability. The
court will only apply the all elements rule after the prosecution
history estoppel analysis is complete.
The Festo decision is sure to have an impact on United States
patent practice. Practitioners must take into consideration the Festo
decision when preparing applications and drafting claims now that a
doctrine of equivalent claim may no longer be made for a patent claim
element that has been amended for a reason related to patentability.
Practitioners are now faced with drafting claims that may be allowed
with minimal or no amendments while trying not to draft claims that
are too narrow in scope.
79 id.
sodM at 567-68.
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Furthermore, the Festo decision changes the scope of all claims in
the million plus unexpired patents that were narrowed by amendment
during prosecution. This change in the scope of claims affects
existing licensing programs and business relationships. Patent owners
now have a much heavier proof burden when it comes to proving
infringement-they must show literal infringement for those claim
elements affected by this decision.
